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Strategic Side Payments: Preferential Trading
Agreements, Economic Reform, and Foreign Aid
Leonardo Baccini Princeton University
Johannes Urpelainen London School of Economics and Political Science
We propose that major powers give foreign aid to developing countries to facilitate politically costly economic
reforms that preferential trading agreements prescribe. Democratic developing countries (1) need adjustment
assistance more than autocracies and (2) can credibly commit to using fungible revenue to compensate the domestic
losers, so a side payment for deeper reforms should only be available for democracies. A quantitative test lends
support to the theory. Fully democratic developing countries that form a preferential trading agreement with the
European Union or the United States obtain a large increase in foreign aid in the short run. These results imply
that donors have used foreign aid to strengthen the effect of preferential trading agreements on economic reforms.
I
nternational political economists have recently
investigated why wealthy countries give foreign
aid.1 Previous research has shown that strategic
interests, such as direct support to military allies or
important trading partners, dominate over altruistic
considerations (Alesina and Dollar 2000). Accordingly,
donors use foreign aid either to support loyal regimes
or to buy policy concessions from governments that are
willing to implement the same in exchange for fungible
resources (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2009).
We show that donors alsouse foreignaid to enhance
the implementation of preferential trading agreements
(PTAs) that induce economic reform in developing
countries. Specifically, we propose that major powers
can use foreign aid to help developing countries survive
the politically and economically costly adjustments
that inevitably accompany liberalization (Geddes
1994; Haggard and Webb 1994; Nsouli, Rached, and
Funke 2005; Rodrik 1992, 1996). However, we depart
from previous research by emphasizing the recipient’s
need for adjustment assistance and ability to credibly
commit to using foreign aid to enhance economic
reform. We expect democratic developing countries to
receive more adjustment assistance because their need
for it is greater and they can better honor their treaty
commitments.
Analyzing PTAs between a developing country
and the United States or the European Union (EU), we
find that only developing countries with democratic
institutions obtain an increase in foreign aid upon
forming a treaty. For fully democratic countries, a PTA
results in a substantial increase in foreign aid in the
short run. In contrast, PTA formation has no observ-
able effect on foreign aid flows to nondemocratic
developing countries. Foreign aid helps the EU and
the United States seal reform deals with democratic
developing countries.
These results have several important implications
for international cooperation and political economy.
First, if foreign aid can facilitate economic reform in
the context of PTA formation, interactions between
foreign aid and treaty formation warrant further
attention. Even if foreign aid has limitations as an
instrument of statecraft (Bueno deMesquita and Smith
2009; Stone 2008), it may be effective in conjunction
with a legally binding treaty. Second, our findings
contribute to the PTA literature by showing how
major powers can use PTAs to promote economic
reform. The effectiveness of this strategy depends on
the regime type of a developing country. Finally, our
analysis offers direct evidence for the importance of
credibility in international cooperation (Lipson 2003;
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Martin 2000). Developing countries do not obtain
foreign aid simply because they need it. However,
donors offer fungible resources to governments that
can credibly commit to economic reforms.
Foreign Aid and International
Cooperation
Recent research on foreign aid has investigated both
the effect of and the motivation for giving foreign aid.
These questions are related because the reason why
donors give foreign aid influences allocation. If donors
were completely altruistic, they would allocate foreign
aid to maximize the beneficial effect on development,
such as economic growth or democratization. But
if donors are motivated by self interest, they could
use foreign aid to support repressive dictators or buy
policy concessions that are harmful to broad constit-
uencies (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2009).
Most political economists argue donors do not give
foreign aid for altruistic reasons. Alesina and Dollar
(2000) show that donors give bilateral foreign aid to
politically or economically important countries. For
example, the United States clearly prioritizes strategi-
cally central countries, such as Israel and Egypt. Bueno
de Mesquita and Smith (2009) show that donors give
foreign aid to countries that are willing to offer
valuable policy concessions at a low price. According
to Dunning (2004) and Thacker (1999), bilateral and
multilateral foreign aid during the Cold War was
motivated by the conflict between the United States
and the Soviet Union. Milner and Tingley (2011) show
that material considerations also influence legislative
voting on foreign aid in the United States.
But even if donors behave strategically, it is not
clear how this influences the effect of foreign aid. On
the one hand, Bueno de Mesquita and Smith argue
that foreign aid is used to purchase harmful policy
concessions: ‘‘[w]hen aid is given in return for policy
concessions, it is a winning proposition for donor
political elites, donor constituents, and recipient polit-
ical elites but it is often a bane for the citizenry in most
recipient countries’’ (2009, 311). It is not only that
foreign aid is being wasted, but the policy concessions
that generate inflows of foreign aid reduce the provi-
sion of important public goods. On the other hand,
Burnside and Dollar (2004) find that although domes-
tic institutions for ‘‘good governance’’ do not influ-
ence the allocation of foreign aid, a high quality of
domestic institutions generates a positive relationship
between foreign aid and economic growth. One reason
why this might be true is that, regardless of the mo-
tivation behind giving foreign aid, good domestic
institutions ensure that it is not used in wasteful ways.
Additionally, good domestic institutions can prevent
the government from selling harmful policy conces-
sions to donors.
Regardless of the welfare effects of foreign aid, it
may facilitate international cooperation between do-
nors and recipients. If foreign aid can help a develop-
ing country continue political and economic reforms
that produce rents, both the donor and the recipient
could benefit from trading some foreign aid for valued
reforms. For example, conditional IMF lending can
stabilize and strengthen developing countries, but only
if major powers such as the United States do not
intervene to prevent the enforcement of conditionality
(Stone 2008). Similarly, the promise of future foreign
aid might induce dictators to democratize if they can
expect to remain in power (Wright 2009).
Theory
We study the relationship between foreign aid and
PTA formation. PTAs are an increasingly important
form of treaty cooperation (Mansfield and Milner
1999), as they influence both trade liberalization and
economic liberalization more broadly (Bu¨the and
Milner 2008). Foreign aid is an important instrument
of statecraft for major powers that deal with devel-
oping countries (Baldwin 1986; Milner and Tingley
2011). As fungible revenue, it is an ideal side payment
that donors can use to induce policy adjustments in
developing countries (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith
2009). Nonetheless, previous research has largely down-
played the relationship between treaty cooperation and
foreign aid.
PTAs are also ideal for our specific theoretical
purposes because they require economic reform and
prompt costly adjustments in recipient countries, so
that foreign aid could potentially allow the implemen-
tation of reforms that would otherwise be too costly
for a developing country’s government. To capture
this effect, we identify those developing countries that
are able to credibly commit to not squandering the
windfall revenue.
PTA formation. Why form a PTA? One reason
are traditional gains from trade, such as improvements
in allocative efficiency from reciprocal market access
(Dornbusch 1992; Milner 1999). Yet other rationales
also exist. Mansfield and Reinhardt (2008) emphasize
the beneficial effect of reducing the volatility of trade
strategic side payments 933
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flows. Bu¨the and Milner (2008) show that PTAs can
also increase foreign direct investment because inter-
national rules allow governments in developing coun-
tries to credibly commit to liberalization. Mansfield
and Reinhardt (2003) argue that PTAs are useful as
bargaining tactics in multilateral trade negotiations.
As Fernandez and Portes (1998) argue, PTA
formation can also allow credible commitment to
economic reform. By economic reform, we refer to
policy changes that pry open markets in a developing
country and reduce state intervention. Such economic
reforms are not limited to trade liberalization. They
include privatization, deregulation, financial liberaliza-
tion, and services deregulation. Although PTAs are
nominally trade agreements, they often contain provi-
sions for economic liberalization more generally, such
as national treatment of foreign investors (Bu¨the and
Milner 2008; Manger 2009). The International Trade
Administration at the U.S. Department of Commerce
explicitly states that ‘‘[t]rade agreements are also a tool
for promoting fair competition and encouraging for-
eign governments to adopt open and transparent
rulemaking procedures as well as non-discriminatory
laws and regulations. Trade agreements can strengthen
the business climate by including commitments on
issues of concern along with the reduction and elim-
ination of tariffs.’’2 Similarly, the Europe Agreements
that the EU formed with future membership candi-
dates were intended to promote democratization and
liberalization.
Cameron provides a detailed discussion of the
economic adjustments that NAFTA required in
Mexico: ‘‘Mexico agreed to national treatment for
foreign investors and restrictions on performance that
went well beyond the Uruguay Round . . . [f]inancial
services, which had been closed to foreign companies
since the 1930s, were also liberalized despite serious
reservations about the pace of liberalization on part of
finance officials . . . Mexico agreed to toughen patent
and copyright protection, and improve enforcement of
intellectual property laws’’ (1997, 121–24). Mexico
also implemented environmental and labor reforms
because the U.S. Congress insisted on them as a
condition for market access.
While developing countries may accrue benefits
from economic reform, most PTAs are skewed to-
wards the interests of major powers. This does not
imply, however, that PTAs should not produce liber-
alization. If a developing country privatizes, liberalizes
foreign direct investment, reduces public regulation,
or opens the service sector for foreign entrants,
economic rents are available for large multinational
corporations from Europe and the United States
(Bu¨the and Milner 2008; Cameron 1997; Manger
2009). This observation provides a good basis for
our theoretical argument, as it provides a rationalist
explanation for why major powers would increase
foreign aid in view of PTA implementation.3
Since we are interested in broader reform, as
opposed to narrow trade reforms that are not nec-
essarily difficult to implement (Milner and Kubota
2005), we only investigate EU and U.S. PTAs. Our
theory does not apply to shallow or narrow PTAs,
commonly formed by South-South pairs, that achieve
limited trade liberalization. EU and U.S. PTAs, how-
ever, require broad economic reforms, from service
andfinance to intellectual property rights (WorldBank
2005), so we argue that economic reforms are a key
benefit thereof.
The institutional design of EU and U.S. PTAs
accords with these expectations. We coded the design
provisions of 41 EU and U.S. PTAs. We found that on
average, these PTAs contain 5.2 legal provisions that
specifically refer to intellectual property rights. Every
PTA that we coded has at least one such provision. On
average, we also found 6.9 legal provisions that focus
on foreign direct investment liberalization. By con-
trast, the median number of provisions on these two
issues in the universe of PTAs is zero, with 80% of
PTAs having no provisions. As to services liberaliza-
tion, only 10 out of the 41 did not contain provisions,
and 20 of them had an entire chapter on services
liberalization. These design features are strongly con-
sistent with our theoretical focus on broader economic
reform than trade liberalization.
Foreign aid. If a deep PTA enables deeper
reforms, why increase foreign aid? Although there is
empirical evidence that reforms may produce eco-
nomic benefits in the long run, they are accompanied
by costly adjustments that are harmful to many
segments of the society in the short run (Milner
and Kubota 2005; Nsouli, Rached, and Funke 2005;
Przeworski 1991). As companies and industries lose
protection, transitional unemployment and produc-
tion standstills follow. Those who stand to lose from
2‘‘U.S. Free Trade Agreements’’ http://www.export.gov/fta (accessed
December 20, 2011).
3To be sure, the existence of these benefits does not imply that
such PTAs necessarily improve global welfare. Political econo-
mists have argued that PTAs may induce trade or investment
diversion (Manger 2009) or undermine the multilateral trade
regime (Bhagwati 2008). Our empirical analysis is aimed at
explaining the relationship between PTA formation and foreign
aid. Whether the economic reforms ultimately produce global
economic benefits is beyond the scope of this article.
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liberalization put pressure on the government, so if
the government is not in a position of strength, it
may have to reverse the reforms (Geddes 1994;
Haggard and Kaufman 1997; Przeworski 1991). These
problems are particularly severe in developing coun-
tries because they lack the administrative and institu-
tional capabilities that help developed countries
adjust to changes (Rauch and Evans 2000).
Examples abound. A volume edited by Haggard
and Webb (1994) presents eight case studies of struc-
tural adjustment in developing countries. They show
that coalition formation for reform is fraught with
difficulties and depends both on the right constellation
of interests and the design of the reform package.
Geddes (1994) reviews reform experiences in 11 devel-
oping countries and shows that reversals and failures
are ubiquitous. In many developing countries, such as
Turkey or Mexico, economic reforms have failed on
multiple occasions (Demir 2004; Revenga 1997).
Most importantly, the empirical record of trade
liberalization and other economic reforms in develop-
ing countries suggests that the problem of costly
adjustment is a political one. Given that reforms im-
prove the performance of the economy, it is not clear
that the economic cost of adjustment is prohibitive
even in the short run; yet all reforms have distributional
consequences that engender political opposition
(Rodrik 1992, 1996). If a government is to succeed in
reform, it must form a powerful ‘‘winning coalition’’ in
support of the reform. This problem is present in all
developing countries that undergo reform, even if the
total economic and social cost of adjustment is not
prohibitive.
The political problem of costly adjustment is not
specific to democracies. While citizens have better
access to the government in democracies, the median
voter often benefits from many economic reforms
because they generate economic growth and reduce
consumer prices (Geddes 1994; Milner and Kubota
2005). Thus, the demand for compensation, and thus
resistance to reform, may be equally high, or even
higher, in autocracies. Thus, the effect of regime type
on the demand for compensation is again indetermi-
nate. Brooks and Kurtz concur: ‘‘While initial research
on this topic suggested that authoritarian governments
might be privileged in imposing such painful reforms,
subsequent empirical work found such regimes to
have no particular advantage’’ (2007, 704).
Given these problems, we provide the following
logic of PTA formation. A wealthy donor expects
benefits from economic reform in a developing coun-
try, but the government of the developing country
faces high political and economic adjustment costs in
the short run (Fernandez and Rodrik 1991). The
wealthy donor can deepen the economic reforms that
a PTA induces by providing a side payment. Thus, a
more ambitious deal can be sealed. The wealthy donor
benefits because it gains access to markets. The govern-
ment of a developing country obtains foreign aid. In
the long run, the government of a developing country
may also benefit from the efficiency gains of liberaliza-
tion, though the magnitude of this effect obviously
depends on the design of the PTA.
Experiences with trade liberalization and policy
reform lend support to this contention. According to
Haggard and Webb, compensation to those who
stand to lose from liberalization ‘‘is crucial to securing
support for stabilization and adjustment programs.
In the more successful cases—Chile, Mexico, Spain,
and Thailand—compensation came in the form of
complementary measures that provided effective
compensation while enhancing welfare and economic
opportunity over the longer term and minimizing rent-
seeking opportunities’’ (1994, 24). Equally important is
the problem of administrative capacity. Developing
countries can perhaps easily cut spending or reduce
tariffs, but privatization or regulatory overhaul require
concentrated investment in implementation.
Summarizing the role of international actors in
eight cases, Haggard and Webb write that while
‘‘conditional external support is unlikely to tip the
domestic political balance in favor of reform when
opposition is strong . . . its presence (or absence) can
bolster (weaken) the standing of reforms within
the government’’ (1994, 25). Similarly, Ancharaz
notes that in Sub-Saharan Africa, ‘‘virtually all trade
reforms . . . have been undertaken as an integral
component of structural adjustment programmes
under the supervision of the IMF and/or the World
Bank. The programmes were . . . supported by foreign
assistance . . . conditional on satisfactory progress’’
(2003, 423).
Major donors recognize the beneficial effect of
foreign aid on reform, especially in democratic
developing countries. Both the EU and the United
States have established broad assistance programs
that specifically address PTA formation, and addition-
ally the inclusion of adjustment aid provisions in PTAs
is relatively uniform across specific treaties.4 Major
powers use their bargaining advantage to determine
the use of foreign aid for economic reform, whereas
4For the EU, see ‘‘The Western Balkan Countries on the Road to
the European Union.’’ European Commission. http://ec.europa.eu/
enlargement (accessed December 20, 2011). For the United States,
see Congressional Research Service (2005, 2007).
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the weaker developing countries are generally on the
receiving side.
Regime Type. If foreign aid facilitates economic
reform by mitigating the problem of political resistance,
should all developing countries experience an increase
in foreign aid if they form a PTA? This reasoning fails
because the developing country must (1) need the
foreign aid to compensate domestic losers from reform
and (2) be able to credibly commit to doing so.
We argue that democratic developing countries are
better suited for adjustment assistance than autocratic
countries.5 The first reason is that democratic countries
benefit more from using the foreign aid to implement
reforms. If the donor gives adjustment assistance to a
democratic government, it understands that the dem-
ocratic government needs to use this revenue to bribe
opponents or suppress domestic political resistance.
Sweeping economic reforms in foreign direct invest-
ment, trading sectors, services, and state enterprises
produce adjustment costs that accrue to broad constit-
uencies. The political survival of a democratic govern-
ment depends on a relatively broad support base, so it
has strong incentives to use foreign aid to compensate
the losers from reform.
Suppose now the donor forms a PTA with an
autocracy. We argue the benefits of providing foreign
aid are limited. On the one hand, an autocratic leader’s
winning coalition is smaller than a democratic leader’s,
so the former can more easily target the reforms
required to implement a PTA in such a fashion that
key elite constituencies do not suffer.6 In this case,
foreign aid is simply not needed: even though the
autocracy would prefer more foreign aid, the donor
understands that the autocracy can implement eco-
nomic reforms even without additional adjustment
assistance. Therefore, the autocratic ruler’s threat to
not reform without a large aid package is non-credible.
Conversely, a democratic ruler can credibly threaten not
to implement economic reforms without adjustment
assistance.
In addition to greater need for foreign aid, democ-
racies benefit from their superior ability to credibly
commit to using the foreign aid to facilitate economic
reform. As Lipson (2003) argues, democracies are
‘‘reliable partners.’’ Similarly, Martin (2000) empha-
sizes the ability of the legislature to constrain the
executive while Svolik (2006) argues that transparency
is the most important advantage of being democratic.
Applied to the dilemma of costly adjustment, domestic
institutional constraints and transparent decision mak-
ing should help democracies credibly commit to using
foreign aid to comply with the contractual obligations
enshrined in a PTA. Institutional constraints mean that
democratic rulers cannot easily divert foreign aid from
economic reform to other programs. Transparency
means that if they do so, they are easily caught. In
contrast, autocratic rulers can more easily divert funds
and expect to get away with this diversion.
Empirical implications. Democratic developing
countries should receive more adjustment assistance
than autocracies because the former need it more and
can credibly commit to using it to promote economic
reform than the latter.
Hypothesis: If a democratic (autocratic) developing
country forms a PTA, it likely receives (does not
receive) additional foreign aid to implement economic
reforms.
We are not arguing that donors necessarily reduce
foreign aid to autocratic developing countries with
whom they form a PTA. Instead, PTA formation may
not have any effect on foreign aid to autocracies. Even
if they were to potentially benefit from adjustment
assistance, dictators cannot credibly commit to using it
to promote economic reform. Similarly, while some
democracies may not obtain adjustment assistance, on
average they should obtain adjustment assistance more
frequently than autocracies.
Our primary focus is on bilateral aid, but we
recognize that major powers such as the EU and the
United States could also leverage multilateral funding
institutions to promote economic reform in their
partner countries (Stone 2011). For example, Vreeland
(2003) has argued that governments in developing
countries have used IMF loan arrangements to force
unpopular reforms on reluctant domestic actors, such
as the legislature. One plausible hypothesis is that PTA
formation has a positive but smaller effect on multi-
lateral than bilateral aid. Below, we find some empirical
evidence in support of this contention.
We are also agnostic as to the exact features of
democratic governance that are most important.
Consequently, we do not disaggregate our hypothesis
into the effect of such factors as veto players, winning
coalitions, and the judicial system. We are aware of
the fact that democracy has many dimensions, and
for many theoretical and empirical questions it is
important to specify exactly how democracy should
influence behavior (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003;
Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland 2010; Przeworski
1991). However, for our purposes, it is the total
5Notably, this argument does not require that autocracies and
democracies ascribe a different value to economic reform.
6For the sectoral politics of trade in autocratic countries, see
Pepinsky (2008).
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effect of democratic institutions, from constraints on
the executive to free elections and civil rights, that is
relevant. To be sure, we verify that our findings are
fully robust to alternative operationalizations of de-
mocracy and examine the effect of credible commitment
structures among democratic developing countries. Sim-
ilarly, we verify that our findings are driven by democ-
racy, as opposed to democratization.
To understand our hypothesis, contrast it with
Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2009) who argue that
donors purchase costly policy concessions from
recipients. They argue that while countries with large
winning coalitions (democracies) should receive for-
eign aid less often than countries with small winning
coalitions (autocracies), the former should obtain
more than the latter, conditional on obtaining any.
This is because a large winning coalition increases
the cost of policy concessions to major powers. Our
hypothesis differs in three ways. First, our policy con-
cessions need not be costly in the long run, as long as
they impose immediate costs on relevant constituencies
in democratic regimes. Second, we do not expect that
democracies form PTAs with major powers less often.
Given that the foreign aid allows mutually profitable
trade cooperation, as opposed to an ‘‘aid for policy’’
deal, this expectation does not follow. Finally, we
emphasize the importance of credible commitment
and provide evidence for this contention. In Bueno
de Mesquita and Smith (2009), credible commitment
does not play a role.
Our main hypothesis has two other notable
features. First, economic indicators of demand, such
as growth or unemployment, should be largely irrel-
evant or at the very least dominated by the supply
side. Even if a developing country urgently needs
adjustment assistance, it should not obtain any unless
it is sufficiently democratic to establish a credible
commitment (Lipson 2003; Martin 2000; Svolik 2006).
Second, the effect is temporary. Once a democratic
developing country has undergone the costly reform,
on average it should not obtain additional foreign aid
from wealthy industrialized countries. Successful reform
weakens protectionist special interests, so the demand
for fungible resources decreases (Hathaway 1998).
Research Design
Our dataset covers 125 developing countries and
spans the years from 1990 to 2007. We include as
many countries as possible given data limitations.
The time frame reflects the fact that PTA prolifer-
ation is a post-Cold War phenomenon (Mansfield
and Milner 1999). Our main statistical model can be
written as follows:
ln Aidij;t
  ¼aþ b1PTAij;t þ b2Regimej;t1
þ b3PTAij;t3 Regimej;t1
þ b4Xij;t1 þ b5Zj;t1 þ gj þ eij;t:
ð1Þ
The dependent variable ln(Aidij,t) is the natural
logarithm of foreign aid from donor i to developing
country j at time t.7 The data are in constant U.S.
dollars, 2007 prices. The data are from the 2008
World Development Indicators (WDI) of the World
Bank. While the WDI provides aggregate foreign aid
data for each recipient, it also provides the data for
each donor-recipient-year. An alternative would be to
use the comprehensive AidData series on foreign aid
at the project level.8 Unfortunately, AidData is missing
some data for aid given by the European Commission
for the first couple of years in our dataset. For example,
according to AidData, total aid given to Poland by the
European Commission before 1995 was 442 dollars
(one project in 1992). By contrast, the WDI data
indicate millions of dollars on an annual basis.
Since we focus on PTA formation, the only donors
that we consider are the United States and the EU.
These two economic and political giants are by far the
most important donors that strategically allocate for-
eign aid to developing countries (Bueno de Mesquita
and Smith 2009; Dunning 2004; Lancaster 2007;
Thacker 1999). As discussed above, PTAs with these
two major powers are also far more demanding than
others, so they are ideal for investigating the impor-
tance of foreign aid towards economic reform (World
Bank 2005). We do not include Japanese PTAs in the
main model because many of them have been formed
very recently, and we do not have data for all of the
required independent variables, but as a robustness
check we also included them. All results continue to
hold.
We treat the EU as a single actor because it has a
common external trade policy. To obtain a figure for
the total foreign aid given by the EU to developing
country j at time t, we sum over bilateral foreign aid
given by member states and add this to the total aid
given by the European Commission. In regard to the
European Commission, we use WDI data that cap-
tures the official development aid. Today, this aid is
primarily given through the European Development
7The EU is treated as a single donor. See below for aggregating
the EU foreign aid data.
8See http://www.aiddata.org.
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Fund and the Development Co-operation Instru-
ment, and these programs are in turn implemented
by EuropeAid.
The main independent variables are PTAij,t and
Regimej,t21. The variable PTAij,t is an indicator that
equals 1 if recipient i and donor j have signed a PTA
between years t 2 4 and t. This formulation captures
the short-term effect that we are investigating. We do
not lag this variable because the donors often demand
reforms at the time of signature (Whalley 1996).
A lagged variable would not capture the instant effect
of PTA formation on foreign aid. Nonetheless, our
results do not change if we lag the variable PTA.
The choice of five years is motivated in view of
adjustments. While many difficult trade sectors are
liberalized with a delay of as many as 15 years, broader
reforms in services and finance generally begin imme-
diately. Thus, the five-year window is appropriate
given our interest in economic reform, broadly de-
fined, as opposed to contentious trade liberalization in
a narrow range of specific sectors.
We also implement two additional models. One
follows the ‘‘event specification’’ in Kuziemko and
Werker (2006).9 We interact Regime with three dif-
ferent time dummies: one for a three-year period
prior to PTA signature (placebo), another for a three-
year period immediately after PTA signature (short-
term effect), and a third one for all the remaining
years. We expect the second interaction to be positive
and statistically significant. By including these differ-
ent year dummies, we can reject the possibility that
Regime and PTA have independent effects but the
interaction term is spurious. We use a three-year
instead of a five-year time period because the dataset
spans only 18 years.10 In another model, we replace
the logarithm of foreign aid with the logarithmized
first difference.11
We consider 39 PTAs notified in the WTO, the
Tuck Trade Agreements Database, and the McGill
Faculty of Law Preferential Trade Agreements Data-
base. We use the year of signature as a proxy for
formation, as opposed to the year of ratification
(Mansfield, Milner, and Rosendorff 2002). However,
this distinction is practically irrelevant because the time
from signature to ratification averages only one year.
Additionally, signature is a reliable predictor of ratifi-
cation in our dataset.
Table 1 provides a list and the Polity IV score for
each country at the time of PTA signature. Note in
particular that our dataset includes PTAs between the
United States and major foreign aid recipients, such
as Egypt and Jordan, that are also stable autocracies.
This stacks the deck against our theory, for these au-
tocratic countries receive substantial amounts of foreign
for security reasons (Alesina and Dollar 2000). The table
also indicates whether these PTAs are notified to the
WTO. Many nonnotified agreements arequire eco-
nomic reforms comparable to those PTAs notified to
the WTO.12
In general, democracy may predict PTA forma-
tion (Mansfield, Milner, and Rosendorff 2002). This
presents a challenge to statistical inference, as it may
be that the PTA is simply a medium for the funda-
mental effects of democracy. Fortunately, in our case,
this problem is of limited concern: democracy is not a
predictor of PTA formation with the EU or the United
States. We demonstrate this in the supplementary
appendix by instrumenting for PTA formation and
noting that the coefficient for democracy is not statisti-
cally significant.
The variable Regimej,t21 is the democracy score of
the recipient j at time t2 1 from Polity IV. It combines
the competitiveness and openness of executive selec-
tion, institutional constraints on executive authority,
the competitiveness of political participation, and the
rules that regulate political participation. We rescale
the index so that 0 denotes full autocracy and 20
denotes full democracy. The interaction term between
PTAij,t and Regimej,t21 allows us to test our main
hypothesis.
As a robustness check, we also use alternative mea-
sures of democracy. These include the Freedom House
index, the Przeworski binary measure (Cheibub,
Gandhi, and Vreeland 2010), the newly introduced
Unified Democracy Score from Pemstein, Meserve,
and Melton (2010), and executive and legislative
competition from the Database of Political Institutions.
As control variables, we include per capita GDP
and the logarithm of aggregate GDP. They measure
the poverty and salience of a developing country, re-
spectively, as emphasized in the aid literature (Alesina
andDollar 2000; Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2009).
9In the supplementary appendix, we consider a dynamic model
(De Boef and Keele 2008).
10Results are similar if we use five-year time periods.
11For negative values of foreign aid, we logarithmize the absolute
value of the decrease and then multiply it by 1. All results hold
if we exclude the negative values.
12To be sure, we also verified that our results hold even if drop all
PTAs that were not notified. The statistical significance levels
decline somewhat due to a loss of positive observations, but the
sign remains unchanged and the expected effect for democracies
remains substantial.
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These data are collected by the IMF (2008). As in
Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2009), we also include
the logarithm of the imports and exports between each
donor and recipient, Trade, as well as government
expenditures as a proportion of GDP to capture the
amount of resources available to the government,
GovShare. The trade variables capture donor-recipient
interdependence, whereas public spending may increase
TABLE 1 Preferential Trading Agreement Summary
Major Power Developing Country Negotiation Signature WTO Regime
EU Albania 2002 2006 Yes 19
EU Algeria 1996 2001 Yes 7
EU Bulgaria 1992 1993 NA 18
EU Chile 2000 2002 Yes 19
EU Croatia 2000 2001 Yes 18
EU Czech Rep. 1990 1992 NA 18
EU Egypt 1995 2001 Yes 4
EU Estonia 1994 1995 NA 16
EU Hungary 1990 1992 NA 20
EU Jordan 1995 1997 Yes 8
EU Latvia 1994 1995 NA 18
EU Lebanon 1995 2002 Yes NA
EU Lithuania 1994 1995 NA 20
EU Macedonia 2000 2001 Yes 16
EU Mexico 1995 2000 Yes 16
EU Morocco 1992 1995 Yes 3
EU Poland 1990 1992 NA 18
EU Romania 1992 1993 NA 15
EU Slovakia 1990 1992 NA 18
EU Slovenia 1993 1997 No 20
EU South Africa 1995 1999 Yes 19
EU Syria 1997 2004 Yes 3
EU Tunisia 1994 1995 Yes 7
EU Turkey 1994 1995 Yes 18
US Bahrain 2004 2004 Yes 3
US CAFTA-DR 2002 2004 Yes 18
US Chile 2000 2003 Yes 19
US Colombia 2004 2006 No 17
US Jordan 1999 2001 Yes 8
US Mexico 1990 1992 Yes 10
US Morocco 2003 2004 Yes 4
US Panama 2004 2007 No 19
US Peru 2004 2006 Yes 19
US Singapore 2000 2002 Yes 8
Japan ASEAN 2005 2008 Yes 16
Japan Brunei 2005 2007 Yes NA
Japan Chile 2005 2007 Yes 20
Japan Indonesia 2005 2007 Yes 18
Japan Malaysia 2004 2005 Yes 13
Japan Mexico 2002 2004 Yes 18
Japan Philippines 2004 2006 Yes 18
Japan Singapore 2001 2002 Yes 8
Japan Thailand 2004 2007 Yes 5
Japan Vietnam 2007 2008 Yes 3
Note: Central America Free Trade Agreement - Dominican Republic (CAFTA-DR) and Association of South East Asian Countries
(ASEAN) are multilateral agreements. In the column on WTO notification, ‘‘NA’’ indicates that one of the countries was not a World
Trade Organization member at that point, so that notification was not required. In the column on regime type, the Polity IV data range
from 0 to 20 and ‘‘NA’’ indicates missing data.
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the need for foreign aid. Data for these two variables are
from the WDI (2008) and the IMF (2008).
We also control for Democratization (Gleditsch
and Ward 2000). Donors may have an interest in
promoting democratization, as Wright (2009) has
argued. It scores 21 if the total change in the level of
democracy in developing country j in the past five years
is negative. It scores 1 if the total change in the level of
democracy in developing country j in the past five years
is positive. It scores 0 if there has been no change in the
past five years. Importantly, the correlation between
Regime and Democratization in our data is only .12, so
these two variables are not collinear.
We also add Political Stability and Conflict be-
cause donors may reduce foreign aid to unstable
countries with a lot of violence. Such conditions may
reduce the effectiveness of aid or put aid workers at
risk. The former variable is derived from the 2008
Quality of Governance Dataset (Kaufmann, Kraay,
and Mastruzzi 2008). It combines several indicators
of the probability that the government is overthrown
by constitutional or violent means. The latter variable
is from the 2009 Armed Conflict Dataset built by the
UNDP and the International Peace Research Institute.
It scores 1 if there is an ongoing conflict in the a
developing country and 0 otherwise. To capture
strategic interests, we include Alliance and Colony
from the Correlates of War Dataset. Both Alesina
and Dollar (2000) and Bueno de Mesquita and Smith
(2009), as well as Thacker (1999), have argued that
donors give more aid to allies and colonies. Each
variables scores 1 if the donor and recipient are allies
or colonies, respectively.
Given the importance of EU accession, we in-
clude a dummy variable EU Applicant that scores 1 if
a developing country has sought accession. The
prospect of future accession could influence the
allocation of EU foreign aid. As a further check, in
the robustness appendix we presents results from a
model of EU PTA formation including a placebo
variable for a five-year period prior to a country’s
formation of an EU PTA. This estimation allows us to
account for other forms of transition aid and reject
the competing hypothesis that they are driving our
empirical results.
We include Distance and Population to measure
other dimensions of the salience of recipient i to
donor j. The data for EU Applicant and Distance are
from the 2005 CEPII Dataset while the data for
population are from 2008 WDI.
Finally, variable WTO scores 1 if a developing
country is a GATT/WTO member and 0 otherwise.
We include it to separate the effect of a specific PTA
from membership in the multilateral trade regime. As
the aid-for-trade literature indicates, multilateral trade
liberalization may also be accompanied by trade
capacity building (Suwa-Eisenmann and Verdier
2007). Variable Regulatory Quality is from the 2008
Quality of Governance dataset (Kaufmann, Kraay, and
Mastruzzi 2008). Since poor regulatory quality could
reduce the effectiveness of foreign aid (Burnside and
Dollar 2004; Easterly 2002), we include it in the main
model. Table A5 in the supplementary appendix
provides descriptive statistics.
A Breusch-Pagan test indicates cross-panel het-
eroskedasticity. Although this does not bias the
results, it influences the standard errors and thus
complicates hypothesis testing. In line with most panel
studies, we use the Huber-White sandwich method for
robust standard errors to obtain a consistent estimate
of the variance-covariance matrix. A Hausman test
confirms that we need to use fixed effects instead of
random effects to account for heterogeneity across
countries in our longitudinal data, so our main
statistical model has fixed effects for each developing
country.
A Wooldridge test for autocorrelation rejects the
null hypothesis that there is no first-order serial
correlation. Thus, we need a statistical model that
can account for an AR(1) process while including
recipient fixed effects. In the main text, we therefore
compute Driscoll and Kraay (1998) standard errors.
This technique is appropriate when the number of
countries large relative to the number of years in the
dataset. In other words, Driscoll and Kraay’s ap-
proach eliminates the deficiencies of other large
T-consistent covariance matrix estimators, such as
the PCSE, which are usually inappropriate when the
cross-sectional dimension N of an econometric panel
us large. In addition to serial correlation, it allows for
cross-sectional dependence. In the robustness section,
we verify that our results hold for alternate methods
to address serial correlation.
Results
Table 2 shows the estimation results for six specifi-
cations of our model. The first column summarizes
the baseline model that includes only the most basic
control variables. The second column summarizes the
expanded model with all control variables introduced
above. Models (3) and (4) present the results using
the first-differenced dependent variable and the
Kuziemko and Werker (2006) event specification.
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Models (5) and (6) present the results with Japanese
PTAs included and for all North-South PTAs.13
Consider the first column. Our main hypothesis
pertains to the conditional effect of forming a PTA as
a function of regime type. Inserting PTAij,t 5 1 and
PTAij,t 5 0 in our main model, the conditional effect
is given by
Dln Aidð Þ
DPTA
¼ b1 þ b3Regime: ð2Þ
For completely autocratic countries, Regime 5 0, so
the expected effect of a PTA on aid is b1 , 0. For
completely democratic countries, Regime5 20, so the
expected effect of a PTA on aid is b11 20b3. 0. The
threshold for a positive expected effect is approx-
imately Regime 5 6.5.
The statistical significance of the estimated inter-
action effect cannot be evaluated using the t-statistic,
so we graph the marginal effect in the upper panel of
Figure 1. For the baseline model, it shows that for
Regime 5 14 and higher, the positive effect is
statistically significant at the conventional p 5 .05
level. These results show that developing countries
forming a PTA experience an increase in the inflow of
foreign aid in the short term. The second column
introduces the full model. The coefficients are similar
to those in the first column. This suggests that our
finding is robust. We graph the marginal effect on the
right of the upper row of Figure 1.
The substantive magnitude of these effects is large,
as shown in Table A6 in the supplementary appendix.
Since our measure of foreign aid is logarithmized, the
TABLE 2 Explaining Aid Allocation in the Short Term
Variables
(1)
lnAid
(2)
lnAid
(3)
lnAid(fd)
(4)
lnAid
(5)
lnAid
(6)
lnAid
Basic Main F.D. K-W (2006) With Japan North-South
Regime 0.05***
(0.02)
0.03
(0.02)
0.09*
(0.05)
0.03
(0.02)
0.01
(0.02)
0.03**
(0.01)
PTA (5 year) -0.74
(0.94)
-0.82
(0.90)
-8.27
(5.00)
-1.32
(0.94)
-2.78***
(0.84)
PTA 3 Regime (5 year) 0.11**
(0.04)
0.11***
(0.04)
0.66**
(0.33)
0.13**
(0.06)
0.10
(0.06)
PTA (3 years) -0.59
(0.69)
PTA 3 Regime (3 years) 0.08
(0.05)
PrePTA (3 years) 0.16
(0.78)
PrePTA 3 Regime (3 years) 0.05
(0.05)
PTA (long term) 0.73
(1.18)
PTA 3 Regime (long term) -0.07
(0.10)
Constant 0.00
(0.00)
0.00
(0.00)
-14.54**
(7.09)
0.00
(0.00)
17.87**
(9.01)
54.74***
(7.81)
Baseline control variables O O O O O O
Baseline 1 Extra control variables O O O O O
Recipient fixed effects O O O O
Dyad fixed effects O
Observations 3,389 3,183 3,343 3,183 4,364 10,964
R2 0.46 0.48 0.01 0.68 0.44 0.46
Number of dyads 250 246 248 246 360 851
Note: Ordinary Least Squares estimation with fixed effects by recipient and Driscoll-Kraay standard errors (AR1). Standard errors in
parentheses. *** p, 0.01, ** p, 0.05, * p, 0.1.
13Examples of non-EU/U.S. North-South PTAs are Australia-
Thailand (2004), Canada-Costa Rica (2002), EFTA-Korea (2005),
and New Zealand-Singapore (2001).
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graph gives the proportional effect of PTA forma-
tion on foreign aid. Concretely, if a fully democratic
developing country received exp(X) dollars of for-
eign aid before forming a PTA, the increase in aid is
approximately exp Xþ1ð Þ
exp Xð Þ ¼ exp 1ð Þ  2:71.
Figure 2 shows the impact of the EU-Chile PTA
(2002) on total foreign aid from the EU to Chile and
the impact of the North American Free Trade Agree-
ment (1992) on total U.S. foreign aid to Mexico.
These examples accord with our predictions. Chile
was a highly democratic country in 2002, with a
rescaled Polity score of 19, and it enjoyed a large
increase in foreign aid. Specifically, the PTA reversed
a steady decline in EU foreign aid to Chile: aid
FIGURE 1 Impact of Preferential Trading Agreements Formation on Aid at Different Values of Variable
Regime
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receipts increased from less than 50 million dollars in
2002 to more than 80 million dollars in 2005 and
remained at 65 million also in 2006.14 In those five
years, the average annual increase was more than
6 million dollars. Conversely, Mexico had a rescaled
Polity score of 10 and did not obtain an increase in
the following years. It received 24.9 million dollars
in 1991, but the sum decreased to 11 million dollars
in 1992. In 1994 and 1995, it only received one and
three million dollars, respectively. In 1996, foreign
aid increased to 1991 levels.15
The results for alternative specifications are stable.
If we rely on first differences or include multiple time
dummies (Kuziemko and Werker 2006), the results
remain unchanged. The results also hold if we include
Japanese PTAs. But the effect disappears if we use all
North-South PTAs instead of those formed by major
powers. This is consistent with our theoretical argu-
ment, and it helps reject the competing explanation
that aid increases associated with PTA formation
would reflect trade cooperation alone. Interestingly,
the estimated effect of North-South PTAs on foreign
aid is negative. This may reflect the fact that trade
concessions are substitutes for foreign aid or the fact
that most PTAs are formed by relatively wealthy and
growing developing countries.
Coefficients for the control variables are reported
in Table A1 in the supplementary appendix. The results
do not contain any surprises. The predicted effects are
largely in line with previous literature. Colonial rela-
tionships and distance to a donor remain consistent
predictors of foreign aid, as do population and the
status of an EU applicant. It is therefore improbable
that our statistical model suffers from omitted-variable
biases that are also not present in previous models,
further strengthening the plausibility of our findings.
Finally, democratization appears not to have a con-
sistent effect on foreign aid. This is important because
it alleviates concerns regarding endogeneity between
foreign aid and regime type.
Additional Evidence
In this section, we provide additional evidence to reject
alternative explanations and address other possible
concerns. We analyze the role of trade cooperation,
economic demand in foreign aid, democracy versus
democratization, effects of PTA formation on foreign in
the short and long term, commitment capacity among
democratic developing countries, reform as a rational
for foreign aid, and the association between PTA for-
mation and economic reform. We also disaggregate the
analysis by donor, consider the role of EU transition
aid, examine multilateral and military aid, and explore
treaty design. Finally, we summarize our other robust-
ness tests and address endogeneity concerns.
Trade Cooperation as an
Alternative Explanation
Model (6) in Table 2 shows that the PTA effect on
foreign aid does not apply in the set of all North-
South PTAs. This is allows us to reject a competing
FIGURE 2 The Observed Effect of Preferential
Trading Agreements Formation on
Aid to Chile (Upper) and Mexico
(Lower)
14In the early 1990s, Chile obtained even more foreign aid due to
recent democratization.
15In 1994, Mexico fell into a severe economic crisis that threatened
the interests of several U.S. commercial banks. Since the
multibillion loans given by the United States and the IMF came
with strings attached and accumulated interest, they do not
present commitment problems to the degree that foreign aid does.
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hypothesis: perhaps the foreign aid increase simply
reflects trade cooperation. This hypothesis is not only
inconsistent with the strong interaction effects be-
tween regime type and PTA formation, but also with
the lack of a positive PTA effect, regardless of regime
type, in the extended North-South sample.
Economic Need as an
Alternative Explanation
So far, we have largely downplayed the possibility
that democratic developing countries obtain adjust-
ment assistance simply because they need it for
economic reasons. Since this prediction is an important
element of the conventional wisdom on economic
reform and the altruistic view of foreign aid allocation,
we now turn to test this ancillary hypothesis. Our
theory predicts that economic need should not be an
important determinant of the contingent effect of a
PTA on foreign aid. According to the economic need
story, the EU and the United States should allocate aid
to a democratic developing country especially if the
latter is under exceptional economic hardship. If
economic need drives the increase in foreign aid that
follows PTA formation, we would expect the extra
inflow of foreign aid to increase with objective
measures of economic hardship, because the donor
would have an interest in reducing the short-term
economic cost of adjustment.
To test this hypothesis, we divide the original sam-
ple into two subsamples. The first subsample contains
nondemocratic developing countries, Regime , 17.
The second subsample contains democratic develop-
ing countries, Regime . 16. For each subsample, we
include an interaction term between a recent PTA
and economic growth. We also include another
interaction term between a PTA and the unemploy-
ment rate. The results are reported in Table A7 in the
supplementary appendix.
We focus on the four interaction terms. The
marginal effects are graphed in Figure 3. Perhaps
surprisingly, the interaction term between PTAs and
economic growth in the democratic subsample has a
positive sign, but it is not statistically significant for
any growth rates. The interactive effect is negative for
autocracies, but it is not statistically significant except
for around zero growth. These findings show that
economic need is largely irrelevant for the effect of
PTA formation on foreign aid. Similarly, the graph
for the interaction between PTAs and unemployment
only shows a negative slope for autocracies, but the
effect is not statistically significant for either regime
type. These findings are largely consistent with the
‘‘revisionist’’ view on economic reform that down-
plays the importance of macroeconomic conditions
while emphasizing the importance of fundamentally
political elements of the puzzle, such as coalition
formation (Geddes 1994; Haggard and Webb 1994;
Milner and Kubota 2005; Rodrik 1992, 1996).
Democracy or Democratization?
A potential threat to the validity of our results is the
relationship between democracy and democratiza-
tion. To verify that our results are not driven by
democratization, we now interact PTA with Democ-
ratization in the last five years for a developing
country. If our theory is correct, we should not see
a consistent positive effect on foreign aid. This
robustness test is particularly important because
many political economists have found that young
and fragile democracies are not as reliable as estab-
lished democracies (Clague et al. 1996; Keefer 2007;
Przeworski 1991).
The estimation results are shown in Table A8 in
the supplementary appendix. Regardless of the spec-
ification that we use, democratization does not
condition the effect of PTA formation on foreign
aid. As our theory predicts, if we control for the level
of democracy, PTA formation does not increase foreign
aid simply because a developing country has recently
undergone a democratic transition. This result also
contradicts the idea that the effect of PTA formation on
foreign aid can be explained with reference to factors on
the demand side.16
The fact that democratization does not have a
clear negative effect on the ability of PTA formation
to increase foreign aid is also consistent with our
theory. While some autocracies might be capable of
credible commitment to economic reform, this reason-
ing cannot be applied to foreign aid. As our literature
review shows, autocrats are particularly prone to using
foreign aid to supply elite supporters with private
goods. It is thus easy to understand why democratiza-
tion seems not to condition the marginal effect of PTA
formation on foreign aid.
16We conducted several robustness tests. We replaced the
Democratization variable with an indicator for a positive change
in the Przeworski binary variable for democracy. As another
robustness test, we only consider changes in Regime that exceed
the threshold 3 often used in Polity IV as a threshold for
democratization. For these measures, the marginal effects are
actually negative and never statistically significant at conventional
levels.
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Credible Commitment Among
Democracies
Even if we can reject economic need as an alternative
explanation, democracies may have other features,
unrelated to credible commitment, that drive our
results. To verify that this is not the case, we conduct
an additional test. First, we use the binary Przeworski
measure of democracy to obtain a set of formally
democratic developing countries, with competitive
elections. Within that set of countries, we then
investigate the impact of changes in executive con-
straints from the Polity score on foreign aid. Since the
Przeworski score is arguably a minimal indicator of
democracy and not that strongly correlated with
executive constraints, it allows us to identify the
effect of executive constraints on foreign aid. Execu-
tive constraints are a key indicator of commitment
capacity, so this test allows us to differentiate credible
commitment from other features of democracy. The
estimation tables and the marginal effect graphs are
given in the supplementary appendix. As expected,
increasingly strict constraints on the executive’s
authority increase the foreign aid effect. For robust-
ness, we also verified that the marginal effects are
similar and statistically significant if we use the Polity
score and apply the standard threshold 17 for a
coherent democracy.17
Foreign Aid and Costly Adjustment
So far, our quantitative tests have focused on the
effect of PTA formation on foreign aid in different
countries. In this section, we provide additional
evidence for the ways major powers use foreign aid.
We investigated the effect of PTA formation on
FIGURE 3 Democracy vs. Autocracy: Impact of Preferential Trading Agreements Formation on Aid at
Different Levels of Economic Growth and Unemployment
17As yet another test, we compared the effect of PTA formation
on foreign aid among Przeworski democracies, distinguishing
between those that are established and those that had recently
democratized. We found that PTA formation has a statistically
significant positive effect on foreign aid only among established
Przeworski democracies. Tables and figures are available from the
authors upon request.
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foreign aid in different economic sectors. Some aid
sectors, such as privatization or trade adjustment,
facilitate economic reform. If our theory is correct,
donors increase foreign aid to democratic developing
countries especially in these sectors. Others, such
as fishing and forestry, should not experience such
increases. We use our main statistical model, but we
investigate aid allocation sector by sector. Since the
WDI data are not given on a sectoral basis, we use
AidData (2011) to aggregate annual foreign aid flows
in different sectors. We used CRS codes provided
by the OECD to find different sectors. The details of
the sectoral analyses are given in the supplementary
appendix.
We found robust support to the importance of
adjustment, as an in-depth analysis of the following
sectors illustrates. The marginal effect of PTA for-
mation on foreign aid increased substantially with
democracy for industrial development; trade adjust-
ment; unemployment reduction and social services;
and privatization. Each sector is directly relevant for
economic reform. Consistent with our theory, the
effect was strongest for these sectors. The effect was
small or did not exist for fishing and forestry; tourism;
and banking. Of these, only banking is directly related
to economic reform.
Reform Effects
We assume PTAs induce painful reforms in develop-
ing countries. This is not necessarily true of PTAs
that focus on trade liberalization in relatively uncon-
troversial sectors. We now demonstrate that PTAs
with the EU and the United States induce broad and
deep reforms beyond trade liberalization: capital
account liberalization; intellectual property rights
protection; and privatization. In conjunction with
the qualitative evidence discussed in the theory sec-
tion, these observations validate a key assumption of
our theoretical argument.
We constructed a time series for all three in-
dicators and every developing country that formed a
PTA with the EU or the United States. For capital
account liberalization, we used the measure devel-
oped by Chinn and Ito (2008). For intellectual
property rights, we used data provided by the World
Intellectual Property Organization on the number of
legislative bills that each country had passed for
protection. For privatization, we used the total value
of revenue from privatization of state enterprises pro-
vided in the World Economic Freedom dataset. The
details of the data are provided in the supplementary
appendix.
We cannot conduct a full causal investigation of
the effect of PTA formation on economic reform
within the confines of this article.18 Since our dataset
covers only 18 years, we were also unable to conduct
a sophisticated analysis of structural breaks in the
data. Instead, we used the following simple proce-
dure. First, for every five-year period in the data
beginning at time t and ending at time t 1 4, we
computed the total change in the reform indicator of
interest (first differences, three indicators in total).
Second, we compared the total five-year change
beginning in any year t during PTA negotiations or
in the five years following signature with the the five-
year changes beginning in preceding years. Thus, we
were able to identify developing countries that
implemented deeper economic reforms during and
after PTA formation than before that in the dataset.
Finally, we replicated this procedure using a one-year
window to identify unprecedented jumps in the data.
We found evidence that PTA formation is asso-
ciated with economic reform in developing coun-
tries.19 For capital account liberalization, we found
unusually deep reforms in 12 out of 29 developing
countries that formed a PTA in our dataset (subject
to data availability). For intellectual property rights,
we found evidence of unusually deep reforms for
24 out of 36 countries. For privatization, we found
such evidence for 23 out of 36 countries. Only two
countries in the dataset, Bahrain and Panama, appear
not to have implemented any unusually deep reforms
as a result of PTA formation. Five countries—Chile,
Egypt, Croatia, Jordan, and Morocco—had imple-
mented all three different reforms.
Finally, we examined the association between
foreign aid from the EU and the United States and
reform in democratic countries (Polity score of16 or
higher). The results are reported in Table A10 the
supplementary appendix, and they demonstrate a
strong association between aid and reform for de-
mocracies. However, such association does not exist
for autocracies.
Disaggregation by Donor
Do the results hold if we separately analyze EU and
U.S. PTAs? We estimated our main model (2)
18In another article (Baccini and Urpelainen, 2012), we analyze
structural breaks in economic reform data for developing
countries.
19If a developing country formed a PTA with both the EU and the
United States, we included only the former treaty. Thus, we only
have 36, not 39, observations.
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separately for the two major powers. We find that the
direction of the interactive effect remains unchanged
for each donor, though the statistical significance
decreases somewhat because of the small number of
PTAs, as shown in Figure A8 in the supplementary
appendix.
EU Transition Aid
As explained above, we estimated a model for the EU
alone with a binary indicator to capture the possibility
that foreign aid precedes PTA signature. We found
that countries forming a PTA with the EU do not see
an increase in the five years prior to PTA formation,
yet they do see such an increase afterwards. This is
shown in Figure A9 in the supplementary appendix.
Military Aid
Could the United States offer military aid to PTA
partners, especially autocracies? We collected data on
U.S. military aid to the countries in our dataset from
the Greenbook of the United States Agency for Interna-
tional Development.20 We found that PTA signature
has no effect on military aid regardless of regime
type, as shown in Figure A10 in the supplementary
appendix.
Multilateral Aid
As explained in the theory section, the EU and the
United States could also use multilateral institutions
to increase foreign aid to PTA partners. We thus used
data on multilateral foreign aid from the OECD.21
We found that PTA formation does have a weak
positive effect on multilateral aid to democracies for
some agencies, though the effect is substantively
smaller and less robust than the effect on bilateral
aid. These results are shown in Figure A11 in the
supplementary appendix.
Treaty Design
If democracies and autocracies have different pro-
pensities to use foreign aid to promote economic
reform, it is important to ensure that the PTAs they
sign are nonetheless sufficiently similar for a compar-
ison. We collected data on the design of EU and U.S.
PTAs and found that, with regard to economic
reform demands, they are very similar for autocracies
and democracies. This is shown in Figure A12 in the
supplementary appendix. As expected, the primary
differences pertain to implementation.
Endogeneity
Democratic developing countries that sign a PTA
with the EU or the United States secure substantially
larger inflows of foreign aid than autocratic developing
countries in that situation. However, reverse causality
may bias our results. Perhaps the EU and the United
States form PTAs with developing countries that
receive foreign aid for other reasons? Similarly, devel-
oping countries might democratize because they are
given foreign aid. In the supplementary appendix, we
discuss the endogeneity problem and offer an empiri-
cal strategy that uses instrumental variables. We
identify powerful instrumental variables both for PTAs
and democracy to capture the possible effect of foreign
aid thereupon. Using these instruments, our results
continue to hold.
Conclusion
Donors and recipients can form PTAs to facilitate
mutually profitable economic, and foreign aid can
facilitate the costly adjustment in developing coun-
tries. However, foreign aid can be diverted to other
uses unless the recipient government can credibly
commit to contractual obligations. Since democracy
is a strong predictor of ability to commit to treaty
obligations, we have hypothesized that it should be
accompanied by a connection between foreign aid
and PTA formation. Our empirical analysis support
the theory.
The theory is consistent with previous research
on donor-recipient bargaining. Developing countries
depend on access to large markets in industrialized
countries for export revenue much more than devel-
oped countries depend on access to the small markets
of developing countries, particularly in the case of
the least developed countries. Consequently, PTAs
are biased towards the interests of wealthy industrial-
ized countries. Our empirical results show that while
developing countries enjoy an increase in foreign aid
in the short run, the effect in the long run is negative.
According to our theory, this is because donors must
offer adjustment assistance only until a successful
reform is completed, so the bargaining effect identified
by Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2009) grows in
importance over time.
20See http://gbk.eads.usaidallnet.gov. Accessed September 13, 2011.
21Specifically, we considered the following multilateral donor
agencies: World Bank IDA, IMF, UNDP, UNFPA, UNICEF, and
UNTA. The data are from the OECD.
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In recent years, a variety of essential international
cooperation problems from environmental protec-
tion to foreign direct investment have required
collaboration between wealthy industrialized coun-
tries and poor developing countries. Since our theory
does not depend on the idiosyncratic features of PTA
formation, it can be applied to investigate a variety of
North-South strategic interactions.
Acknowledgments
We thank the anonymous reviewers, the editors of
The Journal of Politics, Mark Dincecco, Julia Gray,
Mark Manger, James Melton, Helen Milner,
Krzysztof Pelc, Jon Pevehouse, Peter Rosendorff,
Dustin Tingley, and seminar audiences at IBEI
Barcelona and Princeton University for helpful com-
ments on previous drafts.
References
Alesina, Alberto, and David Dollar. 2000. ‘‘Who Gives Foreign
Aid to Whom and Why?’’ Journal of Economic Growth 5 (1):
33–63.
Ancharaz, Vinaye D. 2003. ‘‘Determinants of Trade Policy
Reform in Sub-Saharan Africa.’’ Journal of African Economies
12 (3): 417–43.
Baccini, Leonardo, and Johannes Urpelainen. 2012. ‘‘Interna-
tional Institutions and Domestic Politics: Can Preferential
Trading Agreements Help Leaders Promote Economic Re-
form?’’ Unpublished Working Paper, Princetion University.
Baldwin, David A. 1986. Economic Statecraft. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press.
Bhagwati, Jagdish N. 2008. Termites in the Trading System: How
Preferential Agreements Undermine Free Trade. New York:
Oxford University Press.
Brooks, Sarah M., and Marcus J. Kurtz. 2007. ‘‘Capital, Trade,
and the Political Economies of Reform.’’ American Journal of
Political Science 51 (4): 703–20.
Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, and Alastair Smith. 2009. ‘‘A Political
Economy of Aid.’’ International Organization 63 (2): 309–40.
Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, Alastair Smith, Randolph M. Siverson,
and James D. Morrow. 2003. The Logic of Political Survival.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Burnside, Craig, and David Dollar. 2004. ‘‘Aid, Policies, and
Growth: Revisiting the Evidence.’’ World Bank Policy Re-
search Working Paper 3251.
Bu¨the, Tim, and Helen V. Milner. 2008. ‘‘The Politics of Foreign
Direct Investment into Developing Countries: Increasing FDI
through International Trade Agreements?’’ American Journal
of Political Science 52 (4): 741–62.
Cameron, Maxwell A. 1997. ‘‘North American Free Trade Nego-
tiations: Liberalization Games Between Asymmetric Players.’’
European Journal of International Relations 3 (1): 105–39.
Cheibub, Jose´ Antonio, Jennifer Gandhi, and James Raymond
Vreeland. 2010. ‘‘Democracy and Dictatorship Revisited.’’
Public Choice 143 (1-2): 67–101.
Chinn, Menzie D., and Hiro Ito. 2008. ‘‘A New Measure of
Financial Openness.’’ Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis:
Research and Practice 10 (3): 309–22.
Clague, Christopher, Philip Keefer, Stephen Knack, and Mancur
Olson. 1996. ‘‘Property and Contract Rights under De-
mocracy and Dictatorship.’’ Journal of Economic Growth
1 (2): 243–76.
Congressional Research Service. 2005. ‘‘DR-CAFTA: Regional
Issues.’’ July. U.S. Congress.
Congressional Research Service. 2007. ‘‘Trade Capacity Building:
Foreign Assistance for Trade and Development.’’ January.
De Boef, Suzanna, and Luke Keele. 2008. ‘‘Taking Time Seri-
ously.’’ American Journal of Political Science 52 (1): 184–200.
Demir, Firat. 2004. ‘‘A Failure Story: Politics and Financial
Liberalization in Turkey, Revisiting the Revolving Door
Hypothesis.’’ World Development 32 (5): 851–69.
Dornbusch, Rudiger. 1992. ‘‘The Case for Trade Liberalization in
Developing Countries.’’ Journal of Economic Perspectives 6 (1):
69–85.
Driscoll, John, and Aart Kraay. 1998. ‘‘Consistent Covariance
Matrix Estimation with Spatially-Dependent Panel Data.’’
Review of Economics and Statistics 80 (4): 549–60.
Dunning, Thad. 2004. ‘‘Conditioning the Effects of Aid: Cold
War Politics, Donor Credibility, and Democracy in Africa.’’
International Organization 58 (2): 409–23.
Easterly, William. 2002. The Elusive Quest for Growth. Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press.
Fernandez, Raquel, and Dani Rodrik. 1991. ‘‘Resistance to
Reform: Status Quo Bias in the Presence of Individual-
Specific Uncertainty.’’ American Economic Review 81 (5):
1146–55.
Fernandez, Raquel, and Jonathan Portes. 1998. ‘‘Returns to
Regionalism: An Analysis of Nontraditional Gains from
Regional Trade Agreements.’’ World Bank Economic Review
12 (2): 197–220.
Geddes, Barbara. 1994. ‘‘Challenging the Conventional Wis-
dom.’’ Journal of Democracy 5 (4): 104–18.
Gleditsch, Kristian S., and Michael D. Ward. 2000. ‘‘War and
Peace in Space and Time: The Role of Democratization.’’
International Studies Quarterly 44 (1): 1–29.
Haggard, Stephan, and Robert R. Kaufman. 1997. ‘‘The Political
Economy of Democratic Transitions.’’ Comparative Politics
29 (3): 263–83.
Haggard, Stephan, and Steven B. Webb, eds. 1994. Voting for
Reform: Democracy, Political Liberalization, and Economic
Adjustment. New York: Oxford University Press.
Hathaway, Oona A. 1998. ‘‘Positive Feedback: The Impact of
Trade Liberalization on Industry Demands for Protection.’’
International Organization 52 (3): 575–612.
Kaufmann, Daniel, Aart Kraay, and Massimo Mastruzzi. 2008.
‘‘Governance Matters VII: Aggregate and Individual Gover-
nance Indicators, 1996-2007.’’ World Bank Policy Research
Working Paper 4654.
Keefer, Philip. 2007. ‘‘Clientelism, Credibility, and the Policy
Choices of Young Democracies.’’ American Journal of Political
Science 51 (4): 804–21.
Kuziemko, Ilyana, and Eric Werker. 2006. ‘‘How Much Is a Seat
on the Security Council Worth? Foreign Aid and Bribery
at the United Nations.’’ Journal of Political Economy 14 (5):
905–30.
Lancaster, Carol. 2007. Foreign Aid: Diplomacy, Development,
Domestic Politics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
948 leonardo baccini and johannes urpelainen
This content downloaded from 158.143.197.129 on Fri, 12 Jun 2015 09:35:53 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Lipson, Charles. 2003. Reliable Partners: How Democracies Have
Made a Separate Peace. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press.
Manger, Mark S. 2009. Investing in Protection: The Politics of
Preferential Trading Agreements between North and South.
New York: Cambridge University Press.
Mansfield, Edward D., and Eric Reinhardt. 2003. ‘‘Multilateral
Determinants of Regionalism: The Effects of GATT/WTO on
the Formation of Prefential Trading Agreements.’’ Interna-
tional Organization 57 (4): 829–62.
Mansfield, Edward D., and Eric Reinhardt. 2008. ‘‘International
Institutions and the Volatility of International Trade.’’ Inter-
national Organization 62 (4): 621–52.
Mansfield, Edward D., and Helen V. Milner. 1999. ‘‘The New Wave
of Regionalism.’’ International Organization 53 (3): 589–627.
Mansfield, Edward D., Helen V. Milner, and B. Peter Rosendorff.
2002. ‘‘Why Democracies Cooperate More: Electoral Control
and International Trade Agreements.’’ International Organ-
ization 56 (3): 477–513.
Martin, Lisa L. 2000. Democratic Commitments: Legislatures
and International Commitments. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press.
Milner, Helen V. 1999. ‘‘The Political Economy of International
Trade.’’ Annual Review of Political Science 2: 91–114.
Milner, Helen V., and Dustin H. Tingley. 2011. ‘‘Who Supports
Global Economic Engagement? The Sources of Preferences in
American Foreign Economic Policy.’’ International Organiza-
tion 65 (1): 37–68.
Milner, Helen V., and Keiko Kubota. 2005. ‘‘Why the Move to
Free Trade? Democracy and Trade Policy in the Developing
Countries.’’ International Organization 59 (1): 107–43.
Nsouli, Saleh M., Mounir Rached, and Norbert Funke. 2005.
‘‘The Speed of Adjustment and the Sequencing of Economic
Reforms.’’ International Journal of Social Economics 32 (9):
740–66.
Pemstein, Daniel, Stephen A. Meserve, and James Melton. 2010.
‘‘Democratic Compromise: A Latent Variable Analysis of Ten
Measures of Regime Type.’’ Political Analysis 18 (4): 426–49.
Pepinsky, Thomas B. 2008. ‘‘Capital Mobility and Coalitional
Politics Authoritarian Regimes and Economic Adjustment in
Southeast Asia.’’ World Politics 60 (3): 438–74.
Przeworski, Adam. 1991. Democracy and the Market: Political and
Economic Reform in Eastern Europe and Latin America.
New York: Cambridge University Press.
Rauch, James E., and Peter B. Evans. 2000. ‘‘Bureaucratic
Structure and Bureaucratic Performance in Less Developed
Countries.’’ Journal of Public Economics 75 (1): 49–71.
Revenga, Ana. 1997. ‘‘Employment and Wage Effects of Trade
Liberalization: The Case of Mexican Manufacturing.’’ Journal
of Labor Economics 15 (3): S240–S43.
Rodrik, Dani. 1992. ‘‘The Limits of Trade Policy Reform in
Developing Countries.’’ Journal of Economic Perspectives 6 (1):
87–105.
Rodrik, Dani. 1996. ‘‘Understanding Economic Reform.’’ Journal
of Economic Literature 34 (1): 9–41.
Stone, Randall W. 2008. ‘‘The Scope of IMF Conditionality.’’
International Organization 62 (4): 589–620.
Stone, Randall W. 2011. Controlling Institutions: International
Organizations and the Global Economy. New York: Cambridge
University Press.
Suwa-Eisenmann, Akiko, and Thierry Verdier. 2007. ‘‘Aid and
Trade.’’ Oxford Review of Economic Policy 23 (3): 481–507.
Svolik, Milan. 2006. ‘‘Lies, Defection, and the Pattern of Interna-
tional Cooperation.’’ American Journal of Political Science
50 (4): 909–25.
Thacker, Strom C. 1999. ‘‘The High Politics of IMF Lending.’’
World Politics 52 (1): 38–75.
Vreeland, James. 2003. The IMF and Economic Development.
New York: Cambridge University Press.
Whalley, John. 1996. ‘‘Why Do Countries Seek Regional Trade
Agreements?’’ NBER Working Paper 5552.
World Bank. 2005. Global Economic Prospects: Trade, Regionalism,
and Development. Washington DC: World Bank.
Wright, Joseph. 2009. ‘‘How Foreign Aid Can Foster Democra-
tization in Authoritarian Regimes.’’ American Journal of
Political Science 53 (3): 552–71.
Leonardo Baccini is a Lecturer in the Department
of International Relation at the London School of
Economics, London, WC2A 2AE, U.K.
Johannes Urpelainen is Assistant Professor of
Political Science at Columbia University, New York,
NY 10027.
strategic side payments 949
This content downloaded from 158.143.197.129 on Fri, 12 Jun 2015 09:35:53 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
